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BUSINESS CYCLES
By WESLEY C. MITCHELL
NATI0Na BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCU
The great mass of the unemployed in periods like that which led
President Harding to call the Conference on Unemployment are workers
who have been "laid off" because of business depression.The reason
why millions of men lose their jobs at such times is that employers are
losing money.Hence. it is best to begin a study of methods of stabilizing
employment by looking into the processes which every few years throw
business into confusion.
I. THE NATURE OF BUSINESS CYCLES
Fifteen times within the past one hundred and ten years, American
business has passed through a "crisis/'The list of crisis years (1812,
1818, 1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, 1903, 1907, 1910,
1913, 1920) shows that the periods between successive crises have varied
considerably in length.Further, no two crises have been precisely alike
and.the differences between some crises have been more conspicuous than
the similarities.It is not surprising, therefore, that business men long
thought of crises as "abnormal" events brought on by some foolish
blunder made by the public or the government.On this view each
crisis has a special cause which is often summed up by the newspapers
in a picturesque phrase "the Jay Cooke panic" 011873, "the railroad
panic" of 1884, "the Cleveland panic" of 1893, "the rich man's panic"
of 1903, "theRoosevelt panic" of 1907.
Longer experience, wider knowledge of business in other countries, and
better statistical data have gradually discredited the view that crises are
"abnormal" events, each due to a special cause.The modern view is
that crises are but one feature of recurrent "business cycles."Instead
of a "normal" state of business interrupted by occasional crises, men
look for a continually changing state of business—continually changing
in a fairly regular way. A crisis is expected to be followed by a depression,
the depression by a revival, the revival by prosperity, and prosperity
by a new crisis.Cycles of this sort can be traced for at least one century
in America, perhaps for two centuries in the Netherlands, England, and
France, and for shorter periods in Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
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the Scandinavian countries.Within a generation or two similar cycles
have begun tb run their courses in Canada and Australia, South America,
Russia, British India, and Japan.
At present it is less likely that the existence of business cycles will
be denied than that their regularity will be exaggerated.In fact, succes-
sive cycles differ not only in length, but also in violence, and in the
relative prominence of their various manifestations.Sometimes the
crisis is a mild recession of business activity as in 1910 and 1913; some-
times it degenerates into a panic as in 1873, 1893, and 1907.Sometimes
the depression is interrupted by an abortive revival as in 1895, some-
times it is intensified by financial pressure as in 1896 and 1914.Some-
times the depression is brief and severe as in 1908, sometimes it is brief
and mild as in 1911, sometimes it is both long and severe as in 1874—1878.
Revivals usually develop intofull-fledged prosperity, but there are
exceptions like that of 1895.Prosperity may reach a high pitch as in
1906—1907 and 1916—1917, or may remain moderate until overtaken by
a mild crisis as in 1913, or by a severe panic as in 1893.
These differences among business cycles arise from the fact that the
business situation at any given moment is the net resultant of a complex
of forces among which the rhythm of business activity is only one.Har-
vest conditions, domestic politics, changes in monetary and banking
systems, international relations, the making of war or of peace, the dis-
covery of new industrial methods or resources, and a thousand other
matters all affect the prospects of profits favorably or adversely and there-
fore tend to quicken or to slacken the pace of business.The fact that
the rhythm of business activity can be traced in the net resultants pro-
duced by these many factors argues that it is one of the most constantly
acting, and probably one of the most powerful, factors among them.
To give a sketch of the business cycle which will be applicable to
future cases, it is necessary of course to put aside the complicating effects
of the various special conditions which at any given time are influencing
profits, and to concentrate attention upon the tendency of the modern
business system to develop alternate periods of activity and sluggishness.
Even when the problem is simplified in this way, it remains exceed-
ingly complex.To keep from getting lost in a maze of complications, it
is necessary to follow constantly the chief clue to business transactions.
Every business establishment is supposed to aim primarily at making
money. When the prospects of profits improve, business becomes more
active.When these prospects grow darker, business becomes dull.
Everything from rainfall to politics which affects business exerts its
influence by affecting this crucial factor—the prospects of profits.The
profits clue will not only prevent one from going astray, but will also
enable one to thread the business maze slowly, if he chooses, taking time
to examine all details, or to traverse the maze rapidly with an eye onlyBUSINESS CYCLES 7
for the conspicuous features.Needless to say, in this chapter we shall.
have to move rapidly.'
U. PLAN OF DISCUSSION
Since business cycles run an unceasing round, each cycle growing
out of its predecessor and merging into its successor, our analysis can
start with any phase of the cycle we choose.With whatever phase of
the cycle we start, we shall have to plunge into the middle of things,
taking the business situation as it then stands for granted.But once
this start has been made, the course of the subsequent discussion is fixed
by the succession of phases through which the cycle passes.By following
these phases around the full cycle we shall come back to the starting
point and end the discussion by accounting for the situation of business
which we took for granted at the beginning.
With full liberty of choice, it is well to start with the phase of the cycle
through which American business is passing at present—the phase of
revival alter a depression.The first task will be to see how such a
revival gathers momentum and produces prosperity.Then in order will
come a discussion of how prosperity produces conditions which lead to
crises, how crises run out into depressions, and finally how depressions
after a time produce conditions which lead to new revivals.
This whole analysis will be a brief account of the cycle in general busi-
ness.But it is important to note that different industries are affected
by business cycles in different ways.Some industries, for example, are
hit early and hit hard by a decline in business activity, while other
industries are affected but slightly.This aspect of the subject has
received scant attention from investigators so far, and it cannot be ade-
quately treated until the various industries have collected far more
systematic records of their changing fortunes than are now available
outside a narrow field.But with the cooperation of trade associations
and certain business men we have collected some data that show how
important and how promising is further work along similar lines.This
material concerning the effect of business cycles upon particular industries
will be presented in the next chapter after the cycle in general business
has been traced.
1Theliterature of business cycles is large and rather controversial.The differ-
ences among recent writers, however, are mainly differences in the distribution of
emphasis.Among the best of the recent books upon the subject are the following;
Anaron, A.,"Les Crises Périodiques de Surproduction," 2 vols., Paris, 1913;
HANSEN, A. H., "Cycles of Prosperity and Depression," Madison, Wisconsin, 1921;
HAWTREY, R. G., "Good and Bad Trade," London, 1913; HULL,G.H., "Industrial
Depressions," New York, 1911; MITCHELL, W. C., "Business Cycles," Berkeley,
California, 1913; MooRE, H. L., "Economic Cycles," New York, 1914; RoBERTSON,
D. H., "A Study of Industrial Fluctuation," London, 1915.I,
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ilL REVIVALS AND THE CUMULATiON OF
A period of depression produces after a time certain conditions which
favor an increase of business activity.Among these conditions are a
level of prices low in comparison with the prices of prosperous times,
drastic reductions in the cost of doing business, narrow margins of profit,
ample bank reserves, and a conservative policy in capitalizing business
enterprises and in granting credits.
These conditions are accompanied sooner or later by an increase in
the physical volume of purchases.When a depression begins, business
enterprises of most sorts have in stock or on order liberal supplies of
merchandise.During the earlier months of dullness they fill such orders
as they can get mainly from these supplies already on hand, and in turn
they buy or manufacture new supplies but sparingly.Similarly, families
and business concerns at the end of a period of prosperity usually have a
liberal stock of clothing, household furnishings, and equipment.For a
while they buy little except the perishable goods which must be continu-
ously consumed, like food and transportation.But after depression has
lasted for months, the semi-durable goods wear out and must be replaced
or repaired.As that time comes there is a gradual increase of buying, and
as the seller's stocks are gradually reduced, there is also a slow increase of
manufacturing.
Experience indicates that, once begun, a recovery of this sort tends to
grow cumulatively.An increase in the amount of business that a mer-
chant gets will make him a little readier to renew his shabby equipment
and order merchandise in advance of immediate needs.An increase
in the number of men employed by factories will lead to larger family
purchases and so to more manufacturing.The improving state of trade
will produce a more cheerful state of mind among business men, and the
more cheerful state of mind will give fresh impetus to the improvement
in trade.It is only a question of time when such an increase in the
volume of business will turn dullness into activity.Sometimes the
change is accelerated by some propitious event arising from other than
business sources, for example, good harvests, or is retarded by some
influence, such as political uncertainties.Left to itself, the transforma-
tion proceeds slowly but surely.
While the price level is often sagging slowly when a revival begins,
the cumulative expansion in the physical volume of trade presently stops
the fall and starts a rise.For, when enterprises have in sight as much
business as they can handle with their existing facilities of standard
efficiency, they stand out for higher prices on additional orders.This
policy prevails even in the most keenly competitive trades, because addi-
1Inthis and the three following sections free use has been made of material from
the writer's book, "Business Cycles," published in 1913.BUSINESS CYCLES 9
tional orders can be executed only by breaking in new hands, starting old
machinery, buying new equipment, or making some other change whjch
involves increased expense.The expectation of its coming hastens the
advance.Buyers are anxious to secure or to contract for large supplies
while the low level of quotations continues, and the first definite signs of
an upward trend of quotations brings out a sudden rush of orders.
Like the increase in the physical volume of business, the rise of prices
spreads rapidly; for every advance of quotations puts pressure upon some-
one to recoup himself by making a compensatory advance in the prices
of what he has to sell.The resulting changes in prices are far from even,
not only as between different commodities, but also as between different
parts of the system of prices.In most but not all cases, retail prices lag
behind wholesale, the prices of staple consumers' behind the prices of
staple producers' goods, and the prices of finished products behind the
prices of raw materials.Among raw materials, the prices of mineral
products reflect the changed business conditions more regularly than do
the prices of raw animal, farm, or forest products.Wages rise sometimes
more promptly, but nearly always in less degree than wholesale prices;
discount rates rise sometimes more slowly than commodities and some-
times more rapidly; interest rates on long loans move sluggishly in the
early stages of revival, while the prices of stocks—particularly of common
stocks—generally precede and exceed commodity prices on the rise.The
causes of these differences in the promptness and the energy with which
various classes of prices respond to the stimulus of business activity are
found partly in differences of organization among the markets for com-
modities, labor, loans, and securities; partly in the technical circumstances
affecting the relative demand for and supply of these several classes of
goods; and partly in the adjusting of selling prices to changes in the aggre-
gate of buying prices which a business enterprise pays, rather than to
changes in the prices of the particular goods bought for resale.
In the great majority of enterprises, larger profits result from these
divergent price fluctuations coupled with the greater physical volume of
sales.For, while the prices of raw materials and of wares bought for
resale usually, and the prices of bank loans often, rise faster than selling
prices, the prices of labor lag far behind, and the prices which make up
overhead costs are mainly stereotyped for a time by old agreements
regarding salaries, leases, and bonds.
This increase of profits, combined with the prevalence of business
optimism, leads to a marked expansion of investments.Of course the
heavy orders for machinery, the large contracts for new construction,
etc., Which result, swell still further the physical volumebusiness and
render yet stronger the forces whicli are driving prices upward.
Indeed, the salient characteristiè of this phase of the business cycle
is. the cumulative working of :the processes which are converting10 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
a revival of trade into intense prosperity.Not only does every increase
in the physical volume of trade cause other increases, every convert to
optimism make new converts, and every advance of prices furnish an
incentive for fresh advances, but the growth of trade helps to spread
optimism and to raise prices, while optimism and rising prices both
support eacb other and stimulate the growth of trade.Finally, as has
just been said, the changes going forward in these three factors swell
profits and encourage investments, while high profits and heavy invest-
ments react by augmenting trade justifying optimism, and raising prices.
IV. HOW PROSPERITY BREEDS A CRISIS
While the processes just sketched work cumulatively for a time to
enhance prosperity, they also cause a slow accumulation of stresses
within the balanced system of business—stresses which ultimately under-
mine the conditions upon which prosperity rests.
Among these stresses is the gradual increase in the costs of doing
business.The decline in overhead costs per unit of output ceases when
enterprises have once secured all the business they can handle with their
standard equipment, and a slow increase of these costs begins when
the expiration of old contracts makes necessary renewals at the high
rates of interest, rent, and salaries which prevail in prosperity.Mean-
while the operating costs rise at a relatively rapid rate.Equipment
which is antiquated and plants which are ill located or otherwise work
at some disadvantage are brought again into operation.The price
of labor rises, not only because the standard rates of wages go up, but also
because of the prevalence of higher pay for overtime.More serious still
is the fact that the efficiency of labor declines, because overtime brings
weariness, because of the employment of "undesirables," and because
crews cannot be driven at top speed when jobs are more numerous than
men to fill them.'The prices of raw materials continue to rise faster on
'Compare the discussion of fluctuations of production and of numbers employed
in Section V of Chap. IV, below.Mr. Berridge there shows that physical output
rises more in booms and declines more in depressions than do numbers of employees.
But he agrees with the view here expressed regarding changes in efficiency of labor,
thinking that these changes are more than offset by other factors—notably the preva-
lence of overtime in booms and of part time in depressions.Nevertheless, as George
Soule of The Labor Bureau, Inc. who has kindly read this manuscript points
out, the changes in efficiency of labor here referred to have never been statistically
proved on a large scale.There are factors which tend to decrease efficiency in dull
times, such as the desire to spread out slack work as long as possible, and inability
to keep men on the processes for which they are best fitted.Mr. Soule knows person-
ally some cases in which these causes have caused a decline of production in depression.
He adds that if production does show a decline during booms per hours worked, "man-
agement or some other factor may be partly or even wholly responsible."
For evidence supnorting the text, see the writer's" Business Cycles," pp,BUSINESS CYCLES 11
the average than the selling prices of products.Finally, the numerous
small wastes, incident to the conduct of business enterprises, creep up
when managers are hurried by a press of orders demanding prompt
delivery.
A second stress is the accumulating tension of the investment and
money markets.The supply of funds available at the old rates of
interest for the purchase of bonds, for, lending on mortgages, and the
like, fails to keep pace with the rapidly swelling demand.It becomes
difficult to negotiate new issues of securities except on onerous terms,
and men of affairs complain of the Uscarcityof capital."Nor does the
supply of bank loans grow fast enough to keep up with the demand.For
the supply is limited by the reserves which bankers hold against
their expanding liabilities.Full employment and active retail trade
cause such a large amount of money to remain suspended in active circu-
lation that the cash left in the banks increases rather slowly, even when
the gold supply is rising most rapidly.On the other hand, the demand for
bank loans grows not only with the physical volume of trade, but also
with the rise of prices, and with the desire of men of affairs to use their own
funds for controlling as many business ventures as possible.Moreover,
this demand is relatively inelastic, since many borrowers think they can
pay high rates of discount for a few months and still make profits on
their turnover, and since the corporations which are unwilling to sell
long-time bonds at the hard terms which have come to prevail try to
raise part of the funds they require by discounting notes running only a
few years.
Tension in the bond and money markets is unfavorable to the continu-
ance of prosperity, not only because high rates of interest reduce the
prospective margins of profit, but also because they check the expansion
in the volume of trade out of which prosperity developed.Many pro-
jected ventures are relinquished or postponed, either because borrowers
conclude that the interest would absorb too much of their profits, or
because lenders refuse to extend their commitments farther.
The credit expansion, which is one of the most regular concomitants of
an intense boom, gives an appearance of enhanced prosperity to business.
But this appearance is delusive.For when the industrial army is
already working its equipment at full capacity, further borrowings by
men who wish to increase their own businesses cannot increase appreciably
the total output of goods.The borrowers bid up still higher the prices
of commodities and services, and so cause a further expansion in the
pecuniary volume of trade.But they produce no corresponding increase
in the physical volume of things men can consume. On the contrary,
their borrowings augment that mass of debts, many protected by insuffi-
cient margins, which at the first breath of suspicion leads to the demands
for liquidation presently to be discUssed.12 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
The difficulty of financing new projects intensifies the check which one
important group of industries has already begun to suffer from an earlier-
acting cause.The industries in question are those which produce
industrial equipment—tools, machines, plant—and the materials of
which this equipment is made, from lumber and cement to copper and
steel.
The demand for industrial equipment is partly a replacement demand
and partly a demand for betterments and extensions.The replacement
demand for equipment doubtless varies with the physical quantity of
demand for products; since, as a rule, the more rapidly machines and
rolling stock are run, the more rapidly they wear out.The demand for
betterments and extensions, on the other hand, varies not with the
physical quantity of the products demanded, but with the fluctuations in
this quantity.
To illustrate the peculiar changes in demand for industrial equipment
which follow from this situation, suppose that the physical quantity of a
certain product varied in five successive years as follows:
First year 100,000 tons
Second year 95,000 tons
Third year 100,000 tons
Fourth year 110,000 tons
Fifth year 115,000 tons
This product is turned out by machines each of which will produce one
hundred tons per year.Thus the number of machines in operation each
year was:
First year 1,000 machines
Second year 950 machines
Third year 1,000 machines
Fourth year 1,100 machines
Fifth year 1,150 machines
Each year one-tenth of the machines in operation wears out.The replace-
ment demand for machines was therefore:
First year 100 machines
Second year 95 machines
Third year 100 machines
Fourth year 110 machines
Fifth year 115 machines
The demand for additional machines was far more variable.Neglecting
the first year, for which our illustration does not supply data, it is plain
that no additions to equipment were required the second year when
fifty of the machines in existence stood idle, and also none the thirdBUSINESS CYCLES 13
year.But after all the existing machines had been utilized new machines
had to be bought at the rate of one machine for each one hundred tons
added to the product.Hence the demand for additions to equipment
shown by the number of machines in operation was:




Fifth year 50 machines
Adding the replacement demand and the demand for additions to equip-
ment, we find the total demand for industrial equipment of this type to be:
First year no data
Second year 95 machines
Third year 100 machines
Fourth year 210 machines
Fifth year 165 machines
Of course the figures in this example are fanciful.But they illus-
trate genuine characteristics of the demand for industrial equipment.
During depression and early revival the equipment-building trades get
little business except what is provided by the replacement demand.
When the demand for products has reached the stage where it promises
soon to exceed the capacity of existing facilities, however, the equipment
trades experience a sudden and intense boom.But their business
fails off again before prosperity has reached its maximum, provided
the increase in the physical quantity of products slackens before it
stops.Hence the seeming anomalies pointed out by J. Maurice Clark:
The demand for equipment may decrease. . .eventhough the demand
for the finished product is still growing.The total demand for [equipment]
tends to vary more sharply than the demand for finished products. ..The
maximum and minimum points in the demand for [equipment] tend to precede
the maximum and minimum points in the demand for the finished products, the
effect being that the change may appear to precede its own cause.'
When we add to the check in the orders for new equipment arising
from any slackening in the increase of demand for products, the further
check which arises from stringency in the bond market and the high cost
of construction, we have no difficulty in understanding why contracts for
this kind of work become less numerous as the climax of prosperity
approaches.Then the steel mills, foundries, machine factories, copper
smelters, quarries, lumber mills, cement plants, construction companies,
Business Acceleration and the Law of Demand, Journal of Political Economy,
March, 1917.Also see GEORGE H. HULL, "Industrial Depressions," 1911.Some
materials concerning the sharp fluctuations in the activity of the equipment trades
are given in Chap. II.14 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
general contractors, and the like find their orders for future delivery
falling off.While for the present they may be working at high pressure
to complete old contracts within the stipulated time, they face a
serious restriction of trade in the near future.
The imposing fabric of prosperity is built with a liberal factor of
safety; but the larger grows the structure, the more severe become these
internal stresses.The only effective means of preventing disaster while
continuing to build is to raise selling prices time after time high enough
to offset the encroachments of costs upon profits, to cancel the advancing
rates of interest, and to keep producers willing to contract for fresh
industrial equipment.
But it is impossible to keep selling prices rising for an indefinite time.
In default of other checks, the inadequacy of cash reserves would ulti-
mately compel the banks to refuse a further expansion of loans upon any
terms.But before this stage has been reached, the rise of prices may be
stopped by the consequences of its own inevitable inequalities.These
inequalities become more glaring the higher the general level is forced;
after a time they threaten serious reduction of profits to certain business
enterprises, and the troubles of these victims dissolve that confidence in
the security of credits with which the whole towering structure of pros-
perity has been cemented.
What, then, are the lines of business in which selling prices cannot be
raised sufficiently to prevent a reduction of profits?There are certain
lines in which prices are stereotyped by law, by public commissions,
by contracts of long term, by custom, or by business policy, and in which
no advance, or but meager advances can be made.There are other lines
in which prices are always subject to the incalculable chances of the
harvests, and in which the market value of all accumulated stocks of
materials and finished goods wavers with the crop reports.There are
always some lines in which the recent construction of new equipment has
increased the capacity for production faster than the demand for their
wares has expanded under the repressing influence of the high prices which
must be charged to prevent a reduction of profits.The unwillingness of
producers to let fresh contracts threatens loss not only to contracting
firms of all sorts, but also to all the enterprises from whom they buy
materials and supplies.The high rates of interest not only check the
current demand for wares of various kinds, but also clog the effort to
maintain prices by keeping large stocks of goods off the market until they
can be sold to better advantage.Finally, the very success of other
enterprises in raising selling prices fast enough to defend their profits
aggravates the difficulties of the men who are in trouble; for to the latter
every further rise of prices for products which they buy means a further
strain upon their already stretched resources.
As prosperity approaches its height, then, a sharp contrast developsBUSINESS CYCLES 15
between the business prospects of different enterprises.Many, probably
the majority, are making more money than at any previous stage of the
business cycle.But an important minority, at least, face the prospect of
declining profits.The more intense prosperity becomes, the larger grows
this threatened group.It is only a question of time when these conditions,
bred by prosperity, will force some radical readjustment.
Now such a decline of profits threatens worse consequences than the
failure to realize expected dividends, for it arouses doubt concerning the
security of outstanding credits.Business credit is based primarily upon
the capitalized value of present and prospective profits, and the volume of
credits outstanding at the zenith of prosperity is adjusted to the great
expectations which prevail when the volume of trade is enormous, when
prices are high, and when men of affairs are optimistic.The rise of
interest rates has already narrowed the margins of security behind credits
by reducing the capitalized value of given pr6fits.When profits them-
selves begin to waver, the case becomes worse.Cautious creditors fear
lest the shrinkage in the market rating of the business enterprises which
owe them money will leave no adequate security for repayment; hence
they begin to refuse renewals of old loans to the enterprises which cannot
stave off a decline of profits, and to press for a settlement of outstanding
accounts.
Thus prosperity ultimately brings on conditions which start a liquida-
tion of the huge credits which it has piled up.And in the course of this
liquidation, prosperity merges into crisis.
V. CRISES
Once begun, the process of liquidation extends very rapidly, partly
because most enterprises which are called upon to settle their maturing
obligations in turn put similar pressure upon their own debtors, and partly
because, despite all efforts to keep secret what is going forward, news
presently leaks out and other creditors take alarm.
While this financial readjustment is under way, the problem of
making profits on current transactions is subordinated to the more
vital problem of maintaining solvency.Business managers concentrate
their energies upon providing for their outstanding liabilities and upon
nursing their fluancial resources, instead of upon pushing their sales.
In consequence, the volume of new orders falls off rapidly; that is, the
factors which were already dimming the prospects of profits in certain lines
of business are reinforced and extended.Even when the overwhelming
majority of enterprises meet the demand for payment with success, the
tenor of business developments undergoes a change.Expansion gives
place to contraction, though without a violent wrench.Discount rates
rise higher than usual, securities and commodities fall in price, and as old
orders are completed, working forces are reduced; but there is no epidemic16 BUSINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
of bankruptcies, no run upon banks, and no spasmodic interruption of the
ordinary business processes.
At the opposite extreme from crises of this mild order stand the crises
which degenerate into panics.When the process of liquidation reaches
a weak link in the chain of interlocking credits and the bankruptcy of
some conspicuous enterprise spreads unreasoning alarm among the
business public, then the banks are suddenly forced to meet a double
strain—a sharp increase in the demand for loans, and a sharp increase
in the demand for repayment of deposits.If the banks prove able to
honor both demands without flinching, the alarm quickly subsides.But
if, as in 1873, 1893, and 1907, many solvent business men are refused
accommodation at any price, and if depositors are refused payment in full,
the alarm turns into panic. A restriction of payments by the banks
gives rise to a premium upon currency, to the hoarding of cash, and to
the use of various unla*ful substitutes for money. A refusal by the
banks to expand their loans, still more a policy of contraction, sends
interest rates up to three or four times their usual figures, and causes
forced suspensions and bankruptcies.Collectionsfallintoarrears,
domestic exchange rates are dislocated, workmen are discharged because
employers cannot get money for pay-rolls or fear lest they cannot collect
pay for goods when delivered, stocks fall to extremely low levels, even
the best bonds decline somewhat in price, commodity markets are dis-
organized by sacrifice sales, and the volume of business is violently
contracted.
VI. DEPRESSIONS
The period of severe financial pressure is often followed by the reopen-
ing of numerous enterprises which had been shut for a time.But this
prompt revival of activity is partial and short4ived.It is based chiefly
upon the finishing of orders received but not completely executed in the
preceding period of prosperity, or upon the effort to work up and market
large stocks of materials already on hand or contracted for.It comes to
an end as this work is gradually finished, because new orders are not
forthcoming in sufficient volume to keep the mills and factories busy.
There follows a period during which depression spreads over the whole
field of business and grows more severe.Consumers' demand declines in
consequence of wholesale discharges of wage-earners, the gradual exhaus-
tion of past savings, and the reduction of other classes of family incomes.
With consumers' demand falls the business demand for raw materials,
current supplies, and equipment used in making consumers' goods.
Still more severe is the shrinkage of producers' demand for constructior
work of all kinds, since few individuals or enterprises care to sink money
in new business ventures so long as trade remains depressed and thc
price level is declining.The contraction in the physical volume of busi-BUSINESS CYCLES 17
ness which results from these several shrinkages in demand is cumulative,
since every reduction of employment causes a reduction of consumers'
demand, and every decline in consumers' demand depresses current busi-
ness demand and discourages investment, thereby causing further dis-
charges of employees and reducing consumers' demand once more.
With the contraction in the physical volume of trade goes a fall of
prices; for, when current orders are insufficient to employ the existing
industrial equipment, competition for what business is to be had becomes
keener.This decline spreads through the regular commercial channels
which connect one enterprise with another, and is cumulative, since every
reductiob in price facilitates, if it does not force, reductions in other
prices, and the latter reductions react in their turn to cause fresh reduc-
tions at the starting point.
As the rise of prices which accompanies revival, so the fall which
accompanies depression is characterized by marked differences in degree.
Wholesale prices usually fall faster than retail, the prices of producers'
goods faster than those of consumer's goods, and the prices of raw mate-
rials faster than those of manufactured products.The prices of raw
mineral products follow a more regular course than those of raw forest,
farm, or animal products.As compared with the general index numbers
of commodity prices at wholesale, index numbers of wages and interest
on long-time loans decline in less degree, while index numbers of discount
rates and of stocks decline in greater degree.The only important group
of prices to rise in the face of depression is that of high-grade bonds.
Of course, the contraction in the physical volume of trade and the fall
of prices reduce the margin of present and prospective profits, spread
discouragement among business men, and check enterprise.But they
also set in motion certain processes of readjustment by which depression
is gradually overcome.
The operating costs of doing business are reduced by the rapid fall
in the prices of raw materials and of bank loans, by the increase in the
efficiency of labor which comes when employment is scarce and men are
anxious to hold their jobs, by closer economy on the part of managers,
and by the adoption of improved methods.Overhead costs, also, are
reduced by reorganizing enterprises which have actually become or which
threaten to become insolvent, by the sale of other enterprises at low
figures, by reduction of rentals and refunding of loans, by charging off
bad debts and writing down depreciated properties, and by admitting that
a recapitalization of business enterprises—corresponding to the lower
priëes of stocks—has been effected on the basis of lower profits.'
Soule comments: "I should like to see a specific warning against the theory
—so often resorted to by banks and employers in efforts to 'deflate' wages—that
business cannot revive unless all levels of wages and prices bear exactly the same
relation to each other as before the depression—a sort of 'normal' or mathematically18 B USINESS CYCLES AND UNEMPLOYMENT
While these reductions in costs are still being made, the demand
for goods ceases to shrink and begins slowly to expand—a change which
usually comes after one or two years of depression.Accumulated stocks
left over from prosperity are gradually exhausted, and current consump-
tion requires current production.Clothing, furniture, machinery, and
other moderately durable articles which have been used as long as possible
are finally discarded and replaced.Population continues to increase at a
fairly uniform rate; the new mouths must be fed and new backs clothed.
New tastes appear among consumers andnew methods among producers,
giving rise to demand for novel products.Most important of all, the
investment demand for industrial equipment revives; for, though saving
slackens it does not cease, with the cessation of foreclosure sales and cor-
porate reorganizations the opportunities to buy into old enterprises
at bargain prices become fewer, capitalists become less timid as the crisis
recedes into the past, the low rates of interest on long-term bonds encourage
borrowing, the accumulated technical improvements of several years may
be utilized, and contracts can be let on most favorable conditions as to
cost and prompt execution.
Once these various forces have set the physical volume of trade to
expanding again, the increase proves cumulative, though for a time the
pace of growth is kept slow by the continued sagging of prices.But while
the latter maintains the pressure upon business men and prevents the
increased volume of orders from producing a rapid rise of profits, still
business prospects become gradually brighter.Old debts have been paid,
accumulated stocks of commodities have been absorbed, weak enterprises
have been reorganized, the banks are strong—all the clouds upon the
financial horizon have disappeared.Everything is ready for a revival of
activity, which will begin whenever some fortunate circumstance gives
a sudden fillip to demand, or, in the absence of such an event, when the
slow growth of the volume of business has filled order books and paved
the way for a new rise of prices.
Such is the stage of the business cycle with which the analysis began,
and, having accounted for its own beginning, the analysis ends.
balanced relation.I do not believe the existence of such a normal relationship has
ever been proved.Certainly, it has not been proved that there can be no permanent
changes in price and wage relationships."